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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ST.1\TE OF UT.All,
J>t aiutijj'-Respondcnt,
-vs.\rlLLLAjJ l{EITH BURRIS,

Case
No. 9939

Def cnrl ant-Appellant.

BRIEF

o~F

~TATE~I:B~NT

RESPO·NDENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Fifth District Court of the State of Utah, finding the appellant,
\Yilliam Keith Burris, guilty of the crime of bastardy,
in Yiolation of Section 77-60-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953.
DISPOSITIOX IX LOWER COURT
Pursuant to an unanimous verdict, appellant was
adjudged by the court to be guilty and was ordered to
pay the clerk of the court the sum of $40.00 per month for
support, maintenance and education of the child born to
1
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the complaining \Yitness until the child should reach her
18th birthday . ..:\._ppellant \Yas further ordered to pay the
actual hospital expenses incurred by the mother in prenatal care and delivery of said child, determined by the
court to be $309.30. l\IoreoYer, appellant was ordered
to pay to the clerk of the court all costs of prof.lecution
in the matter.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests this honorable court to affirm
the judgment of the Fifth District Court.

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

Respondent adopts the Statement of Facts contained
under the heading, ''State of the Case and the Issues Involved," in appellant's brief.

ARGUI\IENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
CHANGE OF VENUE.
Article VIII, Section 5, of the Constitution of Utah,
provides in part :

'' * * * All civil and criminal business arising in
any county, must be tried in such county, unless a
change of venue be taken, in such cases as may be
provided by law. * * * ''
2
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'fhis RPetion, insofar as is pertinent to this rasP, is sup-

plPnlPlltPd hy ~P('tion
vides as follows :

78-1~~-7,

U.C.A. 1953, \Yhich pro-

''ln all othPr rases the netion must be tried in
the eounty in \vhich the cause of action arises, or
in thP county in \Yhich any defendant resides at
the eommeneement of the action; provided, that
i r an~· such defendant is a corporation, any county
in ,,·hich such rorporaiton has its principal office
or plnec of business shall be deemed the county in
"·hich such corporation resides \vithin the meaning of this seetion. If none of the defendants resides in this state, such action may be commenced
and tried in any county which the plaintiff may
dPsignate in his complaint; and if the defendant
is about to depart from the state, such action may
be tried in any county where any of the parties
resides or serYice is had, subject, ho\-rever, to the
po"·cr of the court to change the place of trial as
provided by la \\'". " 1
Seetion 77-60-1, U.C.A. 1953, holds that,
''When an unmarried female, pregnant or delivered of a child \vhich by la"T \vill be deemed a bastard, shall1nake conzplaint to a justice of the peace
ltifhiu the county 1chere she may be so pregn.a!Jit.t or
delirererl, or 1cherc the person accused may be
found, and shall accuse, under oath or affirmation,
a person \vith being the father of such child, it
shall be the duty of such justice to issue a ~\Yar
rant against the person so accused and cause him
1

This statute was found to be constitutional and not inconsistent with Article VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution above quoted, in the case
of Sanipoli v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 31 Utah 114, 86 Pac. 865, 10
Ann. Cas. 1142, which held that Article VIII, Section 5 means that the
court shall transact the business of the court, the trial and disposition
of all matters civil and criminal, in the county where the business exists
unless a change of venue be had as by law provided.

3
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to be brought forthwith before him, or, in his absence, before any other justice of the peace in such
county." (Emphasis supplied)
Assuming the statutes not to be exclusive of earh
other, and assuming them to be supplemental to one another, venue in bastardy cases can properly be ( 1) in the
county where the unmarried female resides, or (2) in
the county where the unmarried female delivers the
child, or (3) in the county where the accused may be
found, or ( 4) in the county where the cause of action
arises ( i. e., presumably 'v here the child is born). In any
event under no possibility under the facts of this case
could the action be brought in any other county than Iron.
A bastardy proceeding, although prosecuted in the
name of the state and criminal in form, is nevertheless
civil. State v. Reese, 43 Utah 447, 135 Pac. 270; State v.
Steadman., 70 Utah 224, 259 Pac. 326; State v. McKrvight,
76 Utah 514, 290 Pac. 774; Sta.te v. Kra;nendonk, 79 Utah
239, 9 P. 2d 176.
Section 78-13-9, U.C.A. 1953, controls 1n regard to
a change of venue. This statute provides :
''The court may, on motion, change the place of
trial in the following cases:
'' (1) When the county designated
plaint is not the proper county.

Ill

the com-

'' ( 2) When there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county, city, or
precinct de signa ted in the complaint.
4
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(~)

\Vhen the convenienr(' of "·itnesses and the
ends of justice would be promoted by the change.

H

'' (4) 'Vhen all the parties to an action, by stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the
minutes, agree that the place of trial may be
rhanged to another county. Thereupon the court
must order the rhange as agreed upon.''
The Supreme Court of this state in an early case,
which has been adopted and follo"red in all subsequent
rasPs on this question, held that the matter of a change of
,·pnue in any ease "'"here the court has jurisdiction is
'rithin the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to
rPviP\r and reversal only for an abuse of the discretion.
~ee ~'-,lfatl) Y. Carrington, 15 Utah 480, 50 Pac. 526 (1897);
State Y. Certain. Intoxicating Liquors, 53 Utah 161, 177
Pac. ~;~() (1918) ; lVinters v. Turner, 74 Utah 222, 278 Pac.
816 (1929); Chamblee v. Stocks and Tibbetts, 9 U. 2d 342,
344 P. 2d 980. It seems obvious that there are no facts
st't forth in appellant's brief or in the record which
w·ould substantiate any claim that Judge Day abused his
discretion in refusing to grant appellant's motion for a
change of venue.
In regard to appellant's assertion that the fact that
the jury took a relatiYely short time to reach its verdict
is indicative of pre-judgment of the case. It is a wellestabli~hed principle that the fact the jury returns a verdict after deliberating only a short time does not, standing alone, justify a conclusion the jury acted capriciously
or \rns actuated by passion or prejudice. See Thomas v.
.A.tlanfic Coast Line R. Co., 221 S. C. 462, 71 S.E. 2d 403
5
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( 1952), \Yhere in a negligence action thP jur~T returned
a verdict for plaintiff after only t\venty minutes' <I(\ liberation.
It certainly cannot be asserted that the fart that the
jury took a short time to reach its verdict is indicative
of any pre-judgment of the case on their part, particularly considering the extended and tedious cxamina tion
and cross-examination of all witnesses.

POINT II
THE REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
GRANT APPELLANT AN IMMEDIATE
TRIAL DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL., STATUTORY, OR COMMON LAW RIGHT OF APPELLANT.
In support of appellant's position that error was
committed by the trial court in denying appellant's motion for an immediate trial, appellant cites Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution, \vhich provides in part
as follows:

''In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right * * * to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury * * *.'' (Emphasis added)
It is well established in the State of Utah that even
though prosecuted in the name of the state and crimina.! in form, a bastardy proceeding is nonetheless civil.
State v. Reese, supra; Sta.te v. SteadnuJ;n, supra; State v.

6
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..1/c/\ni.f/hf, ~upra; l"{fate v. Kraneudouk, supra. Thus, it
is clear that the constitutional provisions cited hy appellant n rp inapplicable.
~[orPo\·er,

the Federal Constitution, which uses exactly tltP same language, is only applicable to federal
criminal action, and has no pertinency in state litigation
whatsopver. See Falko1rski v. J.llayo, 173 F. 2d 742.
Section 77-60-4, U.C.A. 1953, says:
''If the defendant pleads not guilty to such information and the case is set for trial on the issue of
fact, and at the da.y appointed for such trial the
wo1uan has 1lOt been delivered or is unable to atfeud, the court may continue the case, but shall require the defendant to give such security as the
court may deem just to insure his presence to
answer such information after the birth of the
child; and if such mother is not able to attend on
the day appointed, such security shall remain in
full force until she is able to attend." (Emphasis
supplied)
The record ( p. 10) indicates that appellant filed his
motion :Jiay 7, 1962. ..._~t that time Miss Bauer \Yas not
yPt delivered and indeed did not deliver until October
14, 19G~. (See R., p. 14, Defendant's Exhibit No. 1)
about t"~o months prior to the time the trial was
actually convened .
.:\ppellant may contend that this statute is not appropriately asserted because Judge Day had not set this
matter for trial and there was not a continuance. While
thi~ may be true, the statute manifests the policy which

-t
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

justifies Judge Day in denying the demand for immediate trial, for if the trial court is authorized by statute
to grant a continuance until the injured woman is delivered, why can it not refuse to set down a trial date
initially until the child is born?
Even assuming that the federal and state constitutional requirements for a speedy trial ,,~ere present in
this case, the facts herein still don't reveal prejudicial
error.
A "speedy trial" guaranteed to one charged
"\Yith a criminal offense by both federal and state constitutions is relative, and dependent upon the surrounding circumstances. Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F. 2d 608,
cert. den. 334 U.S. 849, 68 S. Ct. 1501, 92 L. Ed. 177~.
It has been held that even a lapse of three years did not
deprive defendant of a. speedy trial where defendant
didn't show that he was adversely affected in the preparation or prosecution of his defense. U. S. v. Holmes, 168
F. 2d 888.
POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S INSTRUCTION'S, I~DI
CATING THAT THE FACT AN _._~CCUSATION
WAS MADE AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS
NO EVIDENCE, DID NOT CONSTITUTE Al\
INSTRUCTION TO IGNORE SOME OF THE
EVIDENCE AND, THEREFORE, WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Appellant complains that Judge Day, in Instruction
No. 8, by advising the jury that the fact that a complaint
had been filed did not necessarily indicate the guilt of
8·
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defendant, committed error. In this regard, it should be
uotPd t hn t while the court said:
''You are instructed that this matter arose and
came before the court based upon the complaint of
Bonnie N. Bauer and the information filed by the
district attorney. The complaint and the information are in substance and effect legal pleadings
a.nd a way of getting the matter before the court
for determination. However, such documents are
not evidence and the fact that an accusation is
made is not evidence. Also the fact that the court
instructs you concerning the making on an accusation against the defendant is in itself no evidence and is not to be taken as any indication that
the court either believes or does not believe the
allegation of the said legal pleadings.''
The c.ourt also submitted to the jury the copies of the complaint \vhich were introduced and accepted into evidence
during the course of the trial for the purpose of impeaching the complaining witness's testimony. Therefore, it
is obvious that the instruction pertained to the original
complaint, whic.h was filed in the matter, and had absolutely nothing to do \vith the c.opies which were introduced by defendant in the course of the trial as evidence.
These, of course, were submitted to the jury for inspection and for their consideration and there can be no doubt
that the jury understood that this instruction pertained
to the original complaint and not to the copies which
were introduced for the purposes of impeachment by defending counsel.

9
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POINT IV
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE REC<lRD
TO SUBSTANTIATE THE CLAil\I TI-IA'l,
THE JURY FAILED TO CONSIDER rrHE
EVIDENCE.
Appellant concludes from the fact that a juror was
overheard to remark that he w·as getting tired during the
course of the tedious direct and cross examinations, and
the fact that the jury \Yas out only t\Yenty minutes, that
they failed to consider the evidence submitted. Suffice it
to say that there is no rule of la\v \vhich requires individual jurors to make up their minds in the jury room
or even to discuss the evidence submitted in the jury
room. It seems obvious that jurors at the conclusion
of the oral testimony and an examination of the written
exhibits could reach an answer to the question of guilt
or innocence without discussing with other jurors or
mulling over possibilities \vith other jurors in the jury
room. It is, moreover, clear that all of the jurors were
of one mind on the :first ballot and that extended discussion or argument \vas totally unnecessary after each
juror's opinion \Yas manifested in the jury room. Therefore, any assignment of error based on such a claim is
indefensible.

POINT V.
THERE IS SUFFICIENT LEGALLY ADl\IISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
UNANIMOUS VERDICT OF THE JURY.
Appellant takes issue \Yith the conclusion of the jury

10
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on the grounds that the evidence submitted on the part
of thP StatP \vas not sufficient to justify a conviction. In
rPg-n rd to this <'laim, respondent respectfully calls this
court 'H attPution to the case of State v. J/ cC~tne, 16 Utah
170, jl Pae. 818 ( 1898), "~herein this court appropriatPly stated:
'· • • • But all the surrounding circumstances were
sho,vn to the jury, and they found the issues
against ihe defendant. If the jury believed the
testimony offered on the part of the prosecutrix,
it was clearly sufficient to justify the verdict
found. In such cases, and under such circumstances, it is not \Yi thin the legal po,ver of this
court, under the constitution of this state, to substitute its judgment for that of the jury, even if
so inclined. This question has been passed upon
by this court so frequently that it is unnecessary
to give further reasons, or cite authority, in support of the position taken."
It \Yould be superfluous to state authorities for the
often announced principle that if there is substantial
evidence to support the conviction, the Supreme Court
". ill not examine the "\veight of the evidence favoring the
conviction even though there is a conflict of evidence.
In regard to appellant's claim that there are sub~tantial conflicts and inconsistencies in the prosecuting
"itness 's testimony, it is clear that if the facts are as
appellant urged at trial, there would be inconsistencies.
However, the jury either did not accept the facts urged by
appellant 'vhich would indicate inconsistencies in the
prosecuting "~itness 's testimony or they concluded that

11
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not"--ithstanding these apparent Inconsistencies, l\1iss
Bauer's relevant testimony was true.
In regard to appellant's assertion that the latest art
of intercourse was not within the period of gestation, it
can readily be seen that conception is highly probable ou
the days alleged in the complaint. (Record, page 151,
lines 29-30; page 152, lines 1 to 12.) But, it was also established that if the conception took place on either February 2nd or February 11th, the acts of intercourse would
be within the period of gestation. (See Record, page 222,
lines 29-30; page 223, lines 1 to 22.) These facts were
testified to by defendant's own witness, Dr. Graft.
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that appellant
has not set forth any reason \Yhich would warrant an
a \Yard of the relief for which he asks.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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